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THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON 
PRIVATE POWER 
Larry Alexander• 
In this paper I consider whether and how the Constitution gov-
erns private activity. The topic has been made more complex by 
recent attacks on the distinction that it presupposes, namely, the 
distinction between exercises of public power and exercises of pri-
vate power. Thus, I begin by attempting to untangle and analyze 
separately the different arguments attacking the public/private dis-
tinction. I then tum to the implications of my analyses for the issue 
of when private activity should be subjected to constitutional 
constraints. 
I. THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION(S) 
In recent years there has been a frequently voiced criticism of 
something called the public/private distinction. The criticism goes 
like this: Many legal decisions purport to tum on whether a given 
activity should be assigned to the realm of the public or to the realm 
of the private. Yet the assumption that there are these distinct 
realms is false. Therefore, the legal decisions in question cannot be 
justified on the grounds asserted. They may or may not be incor-
rect, but they are surely confused or deceptive. 
The gist of the criticism is that there can be no distinction be-
tween the public and private realms that would support a legal ar-
gument for a particular decision. The distinction between the 
public and the private collapses because of the interpenetration of 
one realm by the other. 
At this point the general criticism of the public/private distinc-
tion divides into several separate and sometimes inconsistent argu-
ments. One group of arguments focuses on the interpenetration of 
the private by the public. Another group focuses on the interpene-
tration of the public by the private. These groups of countervailing 
arguments about the relative priority of the public and private come 
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in three types. One focuses on the legal interpenetration of the pub-
lic and private, one on the material interpenetration and one on the 
conceptual interpenetration. 
I shall attend to the legal, material and conceptual claims 
about public/private interpenetration in that order. I shall con-
clude that the legal and conceptual claims have a good deal of valid-
ity but have virtually no normative bite. On the other hand, the 
material claim has a good deal of normative potential, but it does 
not support criticism of the public/private distinction. Rather, it 
cautions us to attend to the consequences for both public life and 
private life of any line we might draw to separate those realms. The 
problem is finding anyone who needs to be so cautioned. 
A 
The Supreme Court has said on numerous occasions that key 
constitutional provisions-the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth 
Amendment-apply only to "state action" and not to private ac-
tion.I The line between state action and private action is sometimes 
difficult for the Court to draw, and in many contexts the Court has 
divided over its location.2 But in many other contexts there is no 
question whether the action in question is state action or private 
action, and the rule is that only the former is subject to constitu-
tional constraints. 
The "state action" issue has been the locus of one of the criti-
cisms of the public/private distinction.3 The criticism goes as fol-
lows: All private actions take place against a background of laws 
and have a legal status under those laws. Thus, private actions may 
be legally forbidden, legally required or legally permitted. If they 
are legally permitted, moreover, that permission can be cashed out 
in terms of legal prohibitions and legal immunities. If we couple 
this fact about private actions-that they occur against a back-
ground of various legal duties and immunities, which background 
gives them their legal status-with another fact-that these various 
background legal duties and immunities are paradigmatic "state ac-
tion" -we come to the conclusion that all private action implicates 
I. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, II (1883). 
2. See, e.g., Flagg Brothers v. Broaks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (dividing over whether a 
bailee's sale of goods in pursuance of New York's commercial code was or implicated uncon-
stitutional state action). 
3. See, e.g., Larry Alexander and Paul Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Com-
mand? 73-79 (Greenwood Press, 1988); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 
Nw. U. L. Rev. 503 (1985); Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg 
Bros. v. Brooks, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1296 (1982); Frank Goodman, Professor Brest on State 
Action and Liberal Theory. and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1331, 1335 
(1982). 
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state action. Therefore, no case involving a constitutional challenge 
can be lacking in state action. 
This criticism of the public/private distinction can be best il-
lustrated by focusing on the creditor self-help cases that came 
before the Supreme Court, particularly Flagg Brothers v. Brooks.4 
In Flagg Brothers, New York had adopted section 7-210 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, which permits a warehouseman to sell the 
bailor's goods if the bailor defaults on his obligation to the ware-
houseman. Flagg Brothers sold Brooks's goods in pursuance of that 
statute, and Brooks in turn sued Flagg Brothers for violating her 
constitutional rights, specifically, her right against deprivation of 
property without due process of law. She cited to earlier creditor 
repossession cases in which the Court had required, as a matter of 
due process, some kind of judicial hearing prior to the repossession. 
According to Brooks, because Flagg Brothers had just "adjudi-
cated" Brooks's default on its own and had not sought a judicial 
hearing on the default prior to selling Brooks's goods, Flagg Broth-
ers had violated the Due Process Clause. 
The Supreme Court, in a divided opinion, held there was no 
state action present and, therefore, no constitutional violation.s But 
the criticism I am adumbrating would say that the Court was in 
error. There was state action. Indeed, it was ubiquitous. Section 7-
210 of the Uniform Commercial Code, enacted as a statute of the 
State of New York, is surely state action. (If statutes aren't state 
action, nothing is.) So, too, were the laws of New York that created 
an exception to the law of conversion for Flagg Brothers's sale, that 
prevented Brooks from interfering with it, and that passed good ti-
tle to the purchasers of Brooks's goods. 
Moreover, if the state action present in earlier creditor repos-
session cases6 was unconstitutional state action, then so too must be 
the state action in Flagg Brothers. For the reasons the Court gave in 
those cases for holding that due process requires a pre-repossession 
hearing-reasons focused primarily on the error risk involved in a 
creditor's own evaluation of whether the debtor is in default and has 
4. 436 u.s. 149 (1978). 
5. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. He correctly pointed out that Flagg 
Brothers was not a state actor, though in a subsequent case, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 
U.S. 922 (1982), that fact alone did not bar recovery from a private actor for "acting under 
color of ... law" to deprive plaintiff of a constitutional right. Rehnquist also implied that the 
state laws permitting Flagg Brothers to act as it did, by virtue of being permissive and not 
mandatory, could not violate the Constitution. Justice Stevens, writing for three dissenters, 
disagreed on the latter point, and would have held the New York laws in question unconstitu-
tional, subjecting Flagg Brothers to a damages claim. 
6. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Fuentes v. 
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Co., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
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no defenses7-apply with full force to the self-help sale in Flagg 
Brothers. 
Now I agree with the criticism of the public/private distinction 
when it takes the form of this critique of the state action require-
ment in constitutional law. I have given this critique of the state 
action requirement myself;s and, unlike other positions I have taken 
in print, this is one with which I still agree. 
Nonetheless, there's less-perhaps much less-to this criticism 
than meets the eye. This criticism makes a conceptual claim; and 
one can grant its conceptual claim without yielding on any norma-
tive point, because nothing normative follows from the "there's al-
ways state action" criticism of the public/private distinction. As 
with most conceptual critiques, its acceptance entails less than one 
might imagine. 
First, even if there is always state action, it does not follow that 
the defendant is a state actor subject to constitutional duties. 9 
Flagg Brothers acted in pursuance of the laws of New York, but 
Flagg Brothers is not the State of New York. New York may have 
violated Mrs. Brooks's constitutional rights through its laws permit-
ting Flagg Brothers to sell her goods and pass good title to them. It 
doesn't follow, however, that Flagg Brothers violated any constitu-
tional duty to her: the constitutional duty may run only from New 
York. Mrs. Brooks may have been correct in claiming a constitu-
tional violation but incorrect in claiming that Flagg Brothers com-
mitted it. The issue here is complicated by the Court's holding that 
creditors acting in pursuance of unconstitutional repossession laws 
can be sued for violation of their debtors' constitutional rights.w It 
is conceivable that although only a state may violate duties under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the remedies for such violations may 
include remedies addressed to private actors who have invoked the 
unconstitutional state laws and procedures.tt In any event, it is not 
crystal clear whether the majority in Flagg Brothers failed to see 
that there was a constitutional attack on state laws-paradigmatic 
state action-or whether the majority saw this but believed that the 
wrong defendant was before the Court. 
7. See, e.g., Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 83-84; Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341-42. 
8. See Alexander and Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 73-79 (cited 
in note 3); Lawrence A. Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action and Self-Help 
Repossession, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. 893 (1975). 
9. See Alexander and Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 69-72, 74-75 
(cited in note 3); Alexander, 2 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 896-97, 901 (cited in note 8). 
10. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., supra note 5. 
II. See Alexander and Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 63-69 (cited 
in note 3). 
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Second, to say state action is omnipresent because all acts take 
place against a legal background and have some legal status raises a 
second conceptual issue: is it only "laws" that can be unconstitu-
tional, or can acts that are not lawmaking acts, and perhaps even 
illegal acts, be unconstitutional as well? Consider, in this regard, 
acts of government officials that enforce unconstitutionallaws,12 or 
acts of private citizens that invoke unconstitutionallaws.I3 Or con-
sider acts that violate constitutionally valid laws and that could not 
be made legally permissible without the laws making them so being 
unconstitutional.I4 Can these types of acts violate the Constitution, 
or can only lawmaking acts do so? And how is the class of lawmak-
ing acts defined so that it can be distinguished from other acts?Is 
These conceptual issues regarding what kinds of acts-law-
making, official or private, legal or illegal-can violate constitu-
tional duties are interesting and difficult. But their practical import 
is less than one might expect. Their resolution theoretically affects 
neither whether a complainant should win her lawsuit, nor what her 
remedy should be; their resolution only affects what court, state or 
federal, may hear the suit.I6 
Third, the ubiquity of state action as a conceptual matter does 
not affect the content of constitutional rights and duties. To say, for 
example, that the realm of the private is defined and buttressed by 
law-state action-is not to say that private choices within it are 
held to the same standards as the Constitution imposes on, say, the 
state police or welfare department. Shelley v. Kraemeri7 is both a 
source and an illustration of this confusion. Shelley is usually criti-
cized for its finding of state action in the Missouri courts' enforce-
ment of private covenants. But on that point, Shelley was 
absolutely correct. The problem in Shelley was the Supreme 
Court's immediate jump from "judicial enforcement of private dis-
criminatory covenants is state action" to "judicial enforcement of 
private discriminatory covenants is constitutionally tantamount to 
state discrimination." The latter simply does not follow from the 
former, and the Court never filled in the missing premises. State 
action stands behind private choices. But state action permitting 
and enforcing private choices of a type the state would be constitu-
12. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); Ex Parte Young, 209 
u.s. 123 (1908). 
13. See. e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., supra note 5. 
14. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961). 
15. See Alexander and Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 15-20 (cited 
in note 3). 
16. ld. at 73-74. 
17. 334 U.S. I (1948). 
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tionally forbidden to make is not necessarily or even usually uncon-
stitutional: the state has legitimate, often compelling, and 
sometimes constitutionally compelled reasons for permitting private 
actors to choose in ways that the state itself is constitutionally for-
bidden to choose.ts 
Take, for instance, the claim that the realm of family privacy is 
defined and supported by legal prohibitions and permissions, and 
that these legal prohibitions and permissions have important effects, 
not only on family members, but also on public life.t9 The claim is 
beyond cavil, but what follows from it? 
One thing that does not follow from it is that a legal regime 
that confers liberties and immunities on family members in order to 
create a zone of family privacy is, substantively speaking, constitu-
tionally on a par with a regime of comprehensive regulation of acts 
within marriage. The former may be constitutionally compelled, 
which means the latter is constitutionally suspect. Nor does recog-
nition that a legal regime of family privacy can have bad effects both 
for family members and for the public affect its constitutionally pre-
ferred status. All legal regimes regarding the family will have good 
and bad effects, and the question is which is most justifiable given 
constitutional values. That a regime is not perfect is not to say it is 
not justifiable or even best. 
Thus, the state action critique is valuable insofar as it prevents 
confusion that may affect the merits of a case. Flagg Brothers and 
Shelley v. Kraemer are two examples where conceptual confusion 
may have affected the merits. But important as it is, the conceptual 
point has no direct normative implications. The ubiquity of state 
action does not necessarily entail greater constitutional constraints 
on private decisionmakers.2o 
The same point applies to a companion critique, the argument 
that there is no natural baseline of legal entitlements from which to 
18. For example, the state is constitutionally compelled to permit people to choose their 
spouses or religion on grounds forbidden to the state. 
19. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. Mich. 
J.L. Ref. 835 (1985). 
20. Nor does the absence of an explicit state action requirement affect the substance of 
constitutionally compelled duties, despite what Professor Amar seems to suggest with respect 
to the Thirteenth Amendment. Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 Const. 
Comm. 405 (1993). All it affects is whether the Constitution imposes the duties directly on 
private actors, or whether instead it imposes those duties on lawmakers and requires them to 
impose nonconstitutional legal duties on private actors. The substance of the private actors' 
duties will be the same in either case. All that will differ is whether the violations of the 
duties are constitutional wrongs or nonconstitutional wrongs and whether the suit can be 
brought in federal court or only in state -::ourt. The remedies should be the same. See gener-
ally Alexander and Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 64-66, 70-71 (cited in 
note 3). 
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gauge the constitutionality of legal changes and which itself should 
be considered beyond constitutional assessment.21 The point is cor-
rect. Constitutional analysis can and should be applied to any re-
gime of legal entitlements, the common law regime or any other. 
None is beyond or prior to state action. All are the products of law 
and therefore of state action. But having said that, absolutely noth-
ing follows about the constitutional validity of those legal regimes. 
The common law entitlements may be constitutionally privileged in 
a substantive sense even if they are not privileged in a conceptual 
sense as being beyond or prior to state action.22 
Thus, the claim of interpenetration of the private by the public 
in the legal realm is correct. The private realm is defined by and 
supported by the law, which is a public institution. But absolutely 
nothing follows from the claim as a matter of constitutional or 
moral imperative. Any constitutional or moral argument for legal 
revision must rest on material grounds, not conceptual ones.23 
B 
There is a good deal of criticism of the public/private distinc-
tion that focuses, not on the legal relation between the public and 
private domains, but on the material relation. Some of that criti-
cism is premised on the enormous impact on public life of decisions 
that occur in the private sphere. We want people in the public 
sphere to be public-spirited and to act for the general welfare. But 
the views of people in the public sphere may be warped by their 
experiences in the private sphere, experiences that may cause them 
to be racists, sexists, homophobes or xenophobes.24 We want peo-
ple in the public sphere to utilize their productive talents to the 
fullest. But people's ambitions and self-conceptions may be stunted 
21. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987). 
22. See Emily Sherwin, A Comment on Cass Sunstein's Equality, 9 Const. Comm. 189, 
190 n. 9 (1992). 
23. The reader whose sense of symmetry tells her that this section is asymmetrical is 
correct: I have not dealt with the claim that the private interpenetrates the public in the legal 
realm. One reason for this omission is that I can't find any clear examples of such a claim. 
The closest cousin to such a claim in the modern debate is the public choice literature that 
views laws and lawmaking as extensions of the market for goods and services. See William 
N. Eskridge, Jr. and PhilipP. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation 46-56 (West Pub. 
Co., 1988). As a conceptual matter, it is as possible to collapse lawmaking into private activ-
ity as it is to collapse private activity into lawmaking. See Alexander and Horton, Whom 
Does the Constitution Command? at 25-27 (cited in note 3). Again, however, no substantive 
conclusions follow from such a conceptual maneuver. 
24. See Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in America: An 
Essayforthe ACLU, 27 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 339 (1992); Robert C. Post, Free Speech and 
Religious. Racial, and Sexual Harassment: Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amend-
ment, 32 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 267 (1991). See also Stephen Macedo, Charting Liberal Vir-
tues, in J. Chapman and W. Galston, eds., Virtue 211-12, 222-23 (N.Y.U. Press, 1992). 
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by fear, self-hatred and false consciousness produced by physical 
and mental abuse or by oppressive conditioning in the private 
sphere.25 We want people in the public sphere to be law-abiding. 
But people's respect for the law and for the rights of others may be 
diminished by their access in the private sphere to pornography, 
depictions of violence and hateful speech.26 
No one can gainsay the claim that what takes place within the 
private sphere has enormous material effects on the public sphere. 
Our private activities do shape our public identity and thereby 
shape public life. The recognition of the importance of the family to 
statecraft is as old as Plato's Republic. 
Yet the example of Plato should be cautionary as well as con-
firmatory. It is one thing to point out that relegating choices to the 
private sphere may produce undesirable behavior and undesirable 
spillover effects in the public sphere. It is quite another to conclude, 
therefore, that the choices should be withdrawn from the private 
sphere and directly publicly regulated. Often, the undesirable be-
havior that the private sphere shelters is simply the price we pay for 
the desirable behavior and positive effects on public life that a 
strong private sphere encourages. The too hasty jump from bad 
private choices to shrinkage or eradication of the private sphere is a 
classic example of the best as enemy of the good. It is the jump of 
every totalitarian. Those who believe that because the public de-
fines the private sphere, and because the private sphere materially 
affects the public, there is somehow no difference between a society 
with a private sphere and one without it should re-read Orwell's 
1984 21 or just study the historical examples of totalitarian states. 
25. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Re¥ival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988). 
26. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimination, 71 
B.U. L. Rev. 793 (1991); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the 
Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320 (1989). 
27. George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1949). For an 
excellent analysis of the criticism of the public/private distinction based on the material inter-
pretation of the two spheres, see Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Pri¥ate Distinction, 
45 Stan. L. Rev. I (1992). Gavison defends the distinction on both descriptive and normative 
grounds, pointing out the various meanings the distinction can carry and what normative 
claims are and are not warranted by the fact of material interpenetration. (She also touches 
at points on the claim of legal interpenetration. See, e.g., id., at 16-17.) See also Burt 
Neubome, Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate Speech, 27 Harv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 371, 384-90 (1992) (distinguishing private activity that seeks to establish 
community, which should generally be protected from legal regulation, from private activity 
that seeks material gains from common enterprises); Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and 
Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. I, 104-08 (1991) (arguing for maintaining the distinction between the individual and 
society despite the latter's role in individual self-definition); contra Alan Freeman and Eliza-
beth Mensch, The Public-Pri¥ate Distinction in American Law and Life, 36 Buff. L. Rev. 237, 
256-57 (1987) (arguing for total effacement of the public/private boundaries). See generally 
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The bottom line regarding this claim about the material inter-
penetration of the public by the private is that the claim is correct, 
and that normative conclusions may in fact follow from it. None-
theless, those normative conclusions must be purchased retail, not 
wholesale. Each normative proposal regarding how the private 
sphere should be altered must be examined on its own merits, with 
all of the costs and benefits of the proposal considered. No matter 
how enormous the effects of the private sphere on the public, and no 
matter how bad some of those effects, nothing immediately follows 
regarding altering the private sphere, much less eliminating it.28 
The spillover effects on both the public and private spheres can only 
be assessed case by case. And the existence of these spillover effects 
does not negate the separate existence of public and private 
spheres.29 
c 
The final pair of attacks on the public/private distinction are 
conceptual attacks associated with postmodern thought. One at-
tack is what I call perspectivalism. Its upshot is to reduce a com-
mon public sphere to a multiplicity of separate spheres and 
ultimately to nothing more than an extension of individual selves. 
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 22· 78 (U. of Chi. Press, 1958); Hannah Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism 129·34 (Harcourt, Brace & World, 1951). 
28. Although most of the material attacks on the public/private distinction have fo-
cused on the claim that the private sphere interpenetrates the public, I should mention briefly 
the converse claim regarding material interpenetration, namely, that the public sphere mate-
rially interpenetrates the private. There is no question but that how public life is conducted 
affects the quality of private life. Relations inside the family and the general texture of family 
life are affected by economic policies, the mobility of capital and labor, public education, 
medical insurance, family leaves, abortion policy, childcare, neighborhood crime and many, 
many other facets of public life. Other activities currently considered to lie within the private 
sphere, such as church membership and involvement in other mediating institutions, are simi-
larly affected by public policies of all sorts. 
Again, the fact that public and private realms are not hermetically sealed off from one 
another in terms of effects tells us to be conscious of those effects in making public policy and 
in assessing the constitutionality of public policy. The constitutionality of public policy 
should turn in part on both the public effects of laws maintaining the private sphere and on 
the private effects of laws clearly located within the public sphere. 
29. In addition to the literature that challenges the separate existences of public and 
private spheres, there is an abundant literature that draws overstated distinctions between 
them. Thus, the new civic republicans tend to view the public sphere as a realm of civic 
virtue and the private sphere as a realm of avarice and other forms of self-absorption. See 
Sunstein, 97 Yale L.J. at 1541, 1561 (cited in note 25); Michael A. Fitts, The Vices of Vinue: 
A Political Party Perspective on Civic Virtue Reforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1567 (1988). 
On the other hand, there are many who overly romanticize the private sphere as a realm 
of altruism, commitment and ultimate meaning while denigrating the public sphere as one of 
naked self-interest. See Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction 
247-58 (Clarendon Press, 1990). 
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The public sphere is a construct. Its features depend upon who the 
perceiver is. Thus, the public will be a projection of male exper-
iences and values or female experiences and values, of Eurocentric 
experiences and values or Afrocentric experiences and values, of 
heterosexual experiences and values or homosexual experiences and 
values and so forth.Jo Ultimately, the logical conclusion ofperspec-
tivalism is the complete disintegration of the public sphere into 
Lucy's, Ricky's, Fred's and Ethel's solipsistic experiences and 
values. 
The opposite conceptual attack on the public/private distinc-
tion is the postmodernist claim that the private subject is a social 
construction. What we as subjects can experience, what we can 
value, and what we can think are determined by our language and 
culture. The private self is created by a public culture that it can 
distance itself from only with the conceptual tools that that public 
culture provides.Jt 
Both of these conceptual attacks on the public/private distinc-
tion, carried to the extreme, completely collapse the public and pri-
vate spheres into one another. The first attack asserts the 
conceptual primacy of the private sphere, while the second asserts 
the conceptual primacy of the public sphere. Both attacks, because 
of their sweeping, radical nature, ultimately result in self-undermin-
ing skepticism. The first attack leads to extreme relativism: nothing 
can be good or bad, right or wrong, true or untrue, but only good or 
bad for my group or for me, right or wrong for my group or for me, 
and so forth. Since neither the world nor any one of us can operate 
on the basis of such thoroughgoing relativism, the world and we 
will go on just as before even if we agree with this line of attack. 
Similarly, agreeing with the proposition that we as subjects are 
completely socially constructed does not entail any course of action 
different from what disagreeing would entail. Life will go on the 
30. See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10 (1987). 
31. See Nicola Lacey, State Punishment: Political Principles and Community Values 
144-45 (Routledge, 1988); Charles Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences 187-210 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1985); Roberto Unger, Knowledge and Politics 29-144 (The Free Press, 
1975); Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 323, 387 
(1992); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L. Rev. 1627 (1991); Stanley Fish, 
Almost Pragmatism: Richard Posner's Jurisprudence, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1447 (1990). The 
postmodernist position is a direct descendant of Kant's claim that the phenomenal world is a 
construct of our categories of understanding, categories that Kant assumed to be invariant 
but that post-Kantians relativized to history and culture. See Immanuel Kant, The Critique 
of Pure Reason (N.K. Smith, trans!., 2d ed. Macmillan, 1933); Charles Taylor, Hegel, 141-47, 
225-31, 528-33 (Cambridge U. Press, 1975); Richard Rorty, The World Well Lost, in Conse-
quences of Pragmatism 16 (U. of Minn. Press, 1982); Richard Rorty, Foucault and Epistemol-
ogy, in D. Hoy, ed., Foucault: A Critical Reader 41, 44-45 (Blackwell, 1986). 
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same way whether or not we are socially constructed, and whether 
or not we see that we are. How could things be otherwise?32 
In short, both the relativism of perspectivalism and the deter-
minism of postmodemism are skeptical claims that, like all strong 
forms of skepticism, are ultimately self-undermining and norma-
tively impotent.33 Relativism and social construction leave every-
thing unchanged. 
• • • 
There is a public/private distinction. We perceive matters as 
appropriately assigned to one or the other of these domains in part 
because we are socially constructed to do so.34 And we will differ 
over the appropriate assignment of matters because we will look at 
them from different perspectives.3s Moreover, however we assign 
matters, whatever is assigned to the private domain will have effects 
on the public domain and vice versa. Finally, to the extent that the 
private domain is protected by legal rules, its definition will be a 
public matter. All of this is true, but only some of it is important. 
II. PRIVATE POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION 
How does the foregoing discussion bear on the issue of private 
power and the Constitution? First, it establishes that all exercises of 
private power take place against a background of laws that are par-
adigmatic state action. Thus, any constitutional challenge to the 
32. See Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 773 n. 113, 
779-80 n. 130 (1993); Katharine T. Bartlett, Minow's Social-Relations Approach to Difference: 
Unanswering the Unasked, 17 Law & Social Inq. 437, 465-67 (1992); William Maker, 
(Postmodem) Tales from the Crypt: The Night of the Zombie Philosophers, 23 Metaphilosophy 
311,318-21 (1992); Schlag, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 1700-01 (cited in note 31); Fish, 57 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. at 1464 (cited in note 31). Obviously, the force of the claim that a particular preference 
is socially constructed disappears if the claim is based on all preferences being socially con-
structed. No preference can be "inauthentic" if all are. 
33. Skepticism and determinism, to the extent they purport to criticize knowledge 
claims, end up, because of self-reference, undermining their own claims. If we can never 
know whether any proposition is true, then we can never know whether the proposition "we 
can never know whether any proposition is true" is true. On the self-contradiction of skepti-
cal claims, see Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the 
Worse?, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 871, 901-05, 912-13 (1989). See also Thomas Morawetz, Under-
standing Disagreement, The Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, 
Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 371, 445-46 (1992). 
34. See Frederick M. Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 Va. L. Rev. 671, 
680-81 (1992). I think the "in part" is the point to emphasize. I believe that the postmodem 
version of Kantian epistemology is largely true, but I don't accept the thoroughgoing deter-
minism of social categories. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Prob-
lem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371 (1988). 
35. Again, perspectivalism, like postmodemism, contains a core of truth but overstates 
its case. That we each have a different perspective on the world doesn't mean that there is no 
world but only perspectives. 
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exercise of private power can and should be recharacterized as a 
constitutional challenge to those background laws. 
Second, the foregoing discussion establishes that exercises of 
private power will undoubtedly have public effects, including effects 
on values that are embodied in constitutional norms. Third, how-
ever, the discussion establishes that altering the laws and con-
straining private power will also have effects on both the public and 
private spheres, effects which themselves may be of constitutional 
moment. 
The upshot is that constitutional challenges to private choices 
should be assessed as follows. First, if the choices in question were 
not private choices permitted and enforced by the state through its 
laws, but were the choices of the state itself or choices mandated by 
the state, would they represent unconstitutional state action? In al-
most every case where the answer to that question is "no," the 
state's permission and enforcement of the analogous private choices 
should be deemed constitutional. 
If the state's analogous choices would be unconstitutional, the 
analysis then proceeds to a second question: Are the negative effects 
on constitutional values of the state's permitting and enforcing the 
private choices comparable to the effects on constitutional values of 
the state's analogous choices? If the negative effects of the state's 
choices are different in kind or in large degree from the effects of the 
private choices, the state's permitting the private choices should 
again pass constitutional muster in most cases. 
Finally, if the negative effects of private choices on constitu-
tional values are comparable to the effects of the state's analogous 
choices, the analysis proceeds to a third question: Are the state's 
justifications for permitting the private choices weightier than its 
justifications for its own analogous choices, and sufficiently weight-
ier to support a different constitutional verdict? 
Let me illustrate this three-step analysis by considering various 
exercises of private power that might be thought constitutionally 
dubious. I shall divide the examples into two main groups, one in 
which the state merely permits and enforces the private choices, the 
other in which the state in addition subsidizes the private choices. 
In the first group, consider these cases: a large civic organiza-
tion, important for business and political contacts, excludes blacks 
from membership; a "Christians only" political party bars non-
Christians from membership; a large farm operation refuses to al-
low its migrant workers who live in farm-owned housing to display 
political posters or distribute political pamphlets on the premises; a 
large newspaper requires its reporters to "spin" their stories to favor 
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Republicans; a large corporation requires its employees to disclose 
their political affiliations and submit to random drug testing, and 
reserves the right to fire the employees without a prior hearing; a 
private university restricts student speech and interracial dating; a 
church refuses to allow women to be clerics; and a private creditor 
engages in self-help repossession when it believes its debtor is in 
default. 
In the second group, add to the "Christians only" political 
party example the fact that it receives federal election funds; to the 
large corporation example the fact that it has contracted with the 
state to provide a service, such as running prisons or providing util-
ity service, that had previously been provided by the state itself, and 
that it has been granted monopoly status during the term of the 
contract; to the private university example that it has tax-exempt 
status and receives federal work-study money; and to the church 
example that it has tax-exempt status. 
If we assume that in none of these examples would the state 
itself be able to act as the private chooser is acting or mandate that 
the private chooser act as it is acting (though in fact there is no state 
analogy to a political party or a church), then the analysis moves to 
the second question: What are the negative effects on constitutional 
values of permitting and enforcing the private choices, and how do 
those effects compare to the negative effects of the analogous state 
choices? Being excluded from the large civic organization because 
of race has no direct analogy with respect to state choices, though 
its effects may be comparable to state exclusion from the polity, 
from high level jobs, or from the best schools and neighborhoods. 
There will be stigma, inequality of opportunity, and other setbacks 
to interests. 
The effect on constitutional values of exclusion of non-Chris-
tians from a political party are more difficult to assess. Is the party 
a significant electoral force, as the Jaybirds were in Terry v. Ad-
ams?36 What other parties are open to non-Christians? Exactly 
what constitutional value is at stake? The vote? Free exercise of 
religion? Equality? 
The large firm that limits the political speech of tenant migrant 
farmers has effects on speech comparable to a municipality's limit-
ing sign posting, pamphleteering and so forth. The newspaper's ef-
fects on its reporters' free speech is similar to the effects of a 
government-run newspaper's similar policy. The large corporation 
that fires its employees without prior hearings, runs random drug 
36. 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding that electoral activities of all-white Jaybird Club were 
unconstitutional state action). 
374 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:361 
tests on them, and looks into their political associations will affect 
the employees' speech, privacy, and procedural due process inter-
ests no differently from how those interests would be affected by a 
government employer. The private university with a speech and ra-
cial code will cause effects on constitutional values comparable to 
those a public university would cause. 
The church that excludes women from the clergy is a little dif-
ferent in that the state does not and cannot operate a church. But if 
we look at clergy in the church as persons employed in an impor-
tant occupation, then the state has many comparable positions from 
which it might attempt to bar women and the exclusion from which 
will affect women in comparable ways. 
Finally, the creditor who takes the debtor's car or washing 
machine without a prior hearing on the default will affect the debtor 
the same way whether or not a marshal accompanies the creditor. 
How are these effects on constitutional interests exacerbated or 
altered by coupling the state's permission and enforcement of the 
private choices with a subsidy or grant of monopoly status? Does 
the presence of federal election funds make the political party's ex-
clusion of non-Christians more of a setback of constitutional inter-
ests? Similarly, does tax-exempt status or work-study money 
worsen the effects of the university's speech and racial codes, or the 
church's ban on women clergy? Perhaps the extra harm in the cases 
is to the taxpayer. Or perhaps the use of the monies dries up re-
sources that would otherwise be available to ameliorate the harms 
to those dispreferred by the political party, the university and the 
church. Alternatively, perhaps the harm to constitutional values 
that the subsidies effect is a symbolic one. 
Any marginal harm due to the private corporation's being 
granted a monopoly status may be a product of its increased lever-
age in bargaining with its employees, especially if the employees 
have firm-specific skills. An employee in a competitive market may 
bargain over hearings prior to discharge, random drug tests or in-
trusion into political affairs. If the firm has a monopoly, however, 
the employee's bargaining position is worsened.37 
It is the third step in the analysis where most of the action lies. 
For the question here is whether the state has reasons for permit-
ting, enforcing, and perhaps subsidizing private choices that it lacks 
with respect to its own choices. 
For example, one reason the state has for allowing private or-
ganizations to discriminate in determining membership, on grounds 
37. See Stephen F. Williams, Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Bene-
fits, 12 J. Leg. Stud. 3 (1983). 
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on which the state itself might be constitutionally prohibited from 
discriminating, is that private organizations have associational and 
ideological interests of constitutional significance that the state itself 
does not have or is constitutionally barred from having. Of course, 
the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees3s held that 
those interests were not sufficiently at stake in the case of the 
Jaycees to render unconstitutional Minnesota's attempt to ban the 
Jaycees' discrimination against women. Whatever we think of that 
decision, it is a leap from saying that the state may constitutionally 
ban the discrimination to saying that the state must ban it or violate 
the Constitution. The constitutional interests on the side of the 
right to discriminate, when added to the omnipresent state interest 
in avoiding the enforcement costs of making one more course of 
conduct illegal, may tip the balance in favor of the private 
organization. 
The state's interest in allowing political parties to determine 
their membership is, I believe, quite formidable. Roberts v. Jaycees 
notwithstanding, the ideological position of a party is always altered 
by its membership.39 (Even if young men and young women hold 
the same political views as a statistical matter, the Minnesota 
Jaycees after Roberts will never again express the views of young 
men qua young men.) And although Terry v. Adams,4D the Jaybird 
Party white primary case, suggests that a state's recognizing and 
permitting a whites-only political party is unconstitutional, the case 
for a Christians-only political party has the constitutional interest of 
religious freedom on its side, an interest missing in Terry. (Terry, in 
any event, is a precedent of dubious value for anything beyond its 
unique facts, and arguably was incorrectly decided.) Finally, ad-
ding the federal matching funds to the analysis does not obviously 
alter the state's interest in permitting the discrimination since its 
interest in funding elections does not and may not tum on what it 
thinks of the candidates and parties. 
The state's interests in allowing the farm to control certain 
political activities of worker-tenants are probably as follows. First, 
there is the interest in protecting the prerogatives of property own-
ers over how the property is used and who is invited on the property 
on what conditions; and, second, there is the interest in not having 
to adjudicate the various fact-sensitive cases that would result if pri-
vate property owners were made subject to constitutional restric-
38. 468 u.s. 609 (1984). 
39. The majority in Roberts appeared to deny this because of evidence that young men 
and women held similar views on most issues. See 468 U.S. at 627-28. 
40. See supra note 36. 
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tions regarding speech on the property. Marsh v. Alabama41 and 
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins42 suggest that the property 
owner's property and expressive rights are not sufficiently strong to 
compel the state to cede the owner absolute control over others' 
speech. And Marsh goes further and holds that at least in some 
circumstances, the state must not cede such control, with Hudgens 
v. NLRB 43 refusing to extend Marsh to shopping centers. The 
question then becomes, where do large farms fall in comparison to 
company towns and shopping centers? 
The state's interest in the newspaper example is easy: protect-
ing the newspaper publisher's freedom of speech. If I may "spin" 
an article to favor Republicans, I may require the secretary I've 
employed to type the article to type it the way I've written it, even if 
she disagrees with it. And if I am constitutionally protected against 
contrary regulation to this extent, am I not also protected if I want 
to hire someone to write the story for me and require that person to 
write it the way I want it? If so, then the state has the strongest 
case it can have for allowing the newspaper to control its reporters 
as described: it is constitutionally compelled to do so. 
The large corporation presents a more difficult case. To the 
extent that the corporation's interests in drug testing, in the politics 
of its employees, and in discharges without prior hearings are effi-
ciency-driven, they are no different from the interests the state itself 
would have were it running the enterprise. But there are also usu-
ally interests that the state has in permitting the corporation to 
make such choices that it lacks with respect to its own choices. 
Some would hold that the corporation has the interests that ordi-
nary property owners have in expression44-"this is a Socialist-free 
and a drug-free company"-association, and dominion. And the 
state always has an interest in not adjudicating additional claims. 
The grant of monopoly status serves an independent state interest 
that does not affect the state's interests in permitting the monopoly 
to deal with its employees on terms of its choosing. The Supreme 
Court apparently agrees.4s 
41. 326 u.s. 501 (1946). 
42. 447 u.s. 74 (1980). 
43. 424 u.s. 507 (1976). 
44. See Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Uti/. Comm'n, 475 U.S. l, 17-18 (1986); 
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 447 U.S. at 100; Nicholas Wolfson, Corporate First Amendment 
Rights and the SEC (Quorum Books, 1990). 
45. Compare Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. l (1978) (holding a 
power shut-off without a prior hearing on default to be unconstitutional denial of procedural 
due process where the utility company was municipally-owned) with Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (reaching the opposite result from Memphis Light in the case 
of a privately-owned utility with state-granted monopoly status). 
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The state's interest in allowing the private university to impose 
a speech code is similar to its interest in allowing the newspaper to 
have a "speech code" for its reporters: respecting the university's 
academic freedom. And with respect to the university's code re-
garding interracial dating, the state's interest in permitting it may 
be its respect for institutional autonomy and associational interests. 
If the university receives subsidies, the calculus may change. 
Bob Jones University v. United States46 suggests that the state has no 
constitutional duty to subsidize universities whose racial policies it 
dislikes, and perhaps Rust v. Sullivan47 extends this principle to 
speech of which the state disapproves. But there is still a step from 
arguing that the state has no constitutional duty to subsidize to ar-
guing that the state has a constitutional duty to refuse to subsidize. 
The case of the church that bars women from the clergy is sim-
ilar. After Employment Division v. Smith,4s it is not clear that the 
state is compelled to allow the discrimination by the Free Exercise 
Clause. Surely, however, the state may permit the discrimination 
out of concern for religious liberty. And although Bob Jones would 
support the state's denial of tax exempt status, it does not compel 
such a denial. 
Finally, there is no state interest that I can discern in allowing 
self-help repossession that is lacking when the state sends a marshal 
along with the creditor. If state-assisted repossession without a 
prior hearing on default is unconstitutional, so, too, is the state's 
permitting self-help repossession. 49 
III. CONCLUSION 
Private power is subject to constitutional scrutiny. That is so, 
not because there is no public/private distinction, but because pri-
vate power is a product of public laws and has effects on interests of 
constitutional significance. Some fear recognition of this rather ba-
nal point will lead to a nightmare of courts constitutionalizing all 
private decisionmaking. They would rather, instead, have the 
courts tell the noble lie that the choices of private actors are beyond 
constitutional scrutiny by omitting to acknowledge that those 
46. 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (upholding denial of federal tax exempt status to private uni-
versity with restrictions on interracial dating). 
47. IllS. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding ban on abortion counseling in family planning 
clinics receiving federal funds). 
48. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause never compels religious 
exemptions from laws of general applicability). 
49. See Alexander and Horton, Whom Does the Constitution Command? at 77 (cited in 
note 3). 
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choices are permitted and enforced by the state itself and thus cir-
cumscribed by laws that represent the state's choices. 
What these people fear is indeed nightmarish, but it does not 
follow from a recognition of what is nothing more than a concep-
tual truth. Acknowledging the interpenetration of the private 
sphere by the public law that defines it and acknowledging the ma-
terial effects of private choices on public values do not lead neces-
sarily to the conclusion that private power should be any more 
constrained by constitutional norms than it is currently. To get to 
that conclusion, one needs a normative theory regarding what the 
Constitution requires the law regulating private choices to look like. 
If there are good reasons, themselves of constitutional provenance, 
for leaving private choices ungoverned by the constitutional con-
straints imposed on the state-and I believe in most cases that there 
are-then the public/private distinction will remain as significant in 
constitutional law as it is in the lives we actually lead. 
